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that equities are involved and, therefore, the decisions will vary
with the facts, will also contribute to an increase in the future
cases. Finally, the failure of the courts thus far to clearly define
the problem will result in an increase in the litigated cases. The
courts should, in these cases, recognize at the outset that they are
faced with an equitable problem. If such terms as frustration and
impossibility are used, they should be clearly defined. Instead of
continuing to avoid the use of generalities. the courts should lay
down some general rules to assist them in deciding future cases
and to guide prospective litigants in settling their differences out
of court.
Dowlen Shelton.*

RECOVERY OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN THE ABSENCE
OF A RECOVERY OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES

N LINE with the great weight of authority in this country, Texas
courts allow the recovery of exemplary damages where the
defendant's conduct is malicious, wanton, oppressive, or grossly
negligent. Although the doctrine of exemplary damages is sometimes criticized as "disturbing the harmonious symphony of the
law of damages of which the central theme is compensation," 1 it
has its defenders, and it seems certain that, due to the great weight
of precedent, it will continue to be with us for some time.
In connection with the award of exemplary damages, one of the
problems which has often arisen and about which there is some
conflict is whether there must be a recovery of compensatory damages before exemplary damages may be awarded. Almost without
dissent, the courts agree that the allowance of exemplary damages
does not widen the field of actionable wrongs, and that there must
* LL.B., Southern Methodist University; member of Student Editorial Board, 19501951.
1 McCoRMIcz, DAMAcis (1935) 275.
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first be established a cause of action independent of the claim for
exemplary damages.2 Beyond this point, there is a conflict on the
question of whether a recovery of compensatory damages is also
required. Probably the majority of courts in this country will
allow a recovery of exemplary damages supported by a recovery
of nominal damages only, but a substantial number require the
recovery of compensatory damages.' It seems to be well settled
damthat Texas courts follow the latter rule, denying exemplary
4
only.
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The problem under discussion is sometimes confused by the
employment of loose terminology. Generally speaking, compensatory damages are damages given as an equivalent for the injury
done. They are synonymous with actual damages and are to be
distinguished from nominal damages, which are a small and
trivial sum awarded for a technical injury resulting from a violation of some legal right.5 For the purpose of application of the
rule that there must be an award of actual damages, some courts
consider nominal damages as actual damages. Texas courts have
refused to extend the meaning of actual damages and have held
that nominal damages are not actual damages.' The term "nominal
damages" is, however, often erroneously used to include small
actual damages or damages incapable of measurement. An example of this sort of error is found in the case of Postal Telegraph
& Cable Co. v. Bacher,7 in which an award of 60 cents actual
damages was classified as nominal actual damages and recovery
of exemplary damages denied accordingly.
Another preliminary point to be considered is that some causes
of action require actual damages as one of the essential elements
2Id. at 293.

aNotes, 33 A. L. R. 384, 403 (1924), 81 A. L. R. 912, 917 (1932).
4 Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S. W. 2d 397 (1934) ; Byrd
v. Feilding, 238 S. W. 2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) ; Anderson v. Alcus, 42 S. W. 2d 294
(Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
5 25 C. J. S., Damages, § 2, pp. 454, 458.
6 Anderson

v. Alcus, cited supra note 4.

7 90 S. W. 2d 620 (Tex. Ci,. App. 1935).
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of the cause of action. When this situation exists, it is apparent
that exemplary damages should not be awarded in the absence
of a showing of actual damages for the reason that no cause of
action exists to which the damages may be appended. This result
is consistent with the theory that the allowance of exemplary damages does not widen the field of actionable wrongs.
There remain, however, numerous instances in which a showing
of actual damages is not essential to the maintenance of the suit.
Examples of such actions are those for trespass to realty, actions
for the recovery of realty or personalty, certain defamation actions, and actions in which equitable relief is sought. In these
latter actions in which actual damages are either not essential to
the existence of the cause of action or are so small as to be trivial
in amount, should exemplary damages be awarded in the absence
of a recovery of actual damages? The Texas courts have been
practically unanimous in answering this question in the negative.
The leading case in Texas and the one generally cited as authority
is Girard v. Moore.' In that action, one for the wrongful suing of
writs of attachment and garnishment, the court of civil appeals
certified to the supreme court the question whether exemplary
damages may be recovered when the only actual damages shown
are simply nominal. The supreme court replied in the negative,
laying down the rule that where no actual damages are shown,
there may be no recovery of exemplary damages. No reasoning
was given in support of the rule, but three earlier Texas cases
were cited as authority.
The first of these cases, Flanaganv. Womack,9 was one of assault
and battery. The appellant assigned as error a charge to the effect
that exemplary damages could not be recovered without proof
of actual or compensatory damages. The court approved this
charge, but in doing so indicated that for the purposes of the rule
8 86 Tex. 675, 26 S. W. 945 (1894). This case is erroneously styled "Giraud v. Moore,"
and citations to it frequently take this form.
9 54 Tex. 45 (1880).
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nominal damages could be considered as actual damages. The
court said:
"It is a general rule, that for every unlawful trespass the injured

party is entitled to at least nominal damages. Certainly this should be
so if the trespass was of such character as to authorize exemplary damages. This nominal damage would be the measure of the actual damage
if no other is shown, and must necessarily arise in every case in which
exemplary damages could be given."' 0
The second case, Jones v. Matthews," was a suit for injuries resulting from defendant's maintenance of a house of prostitution.
The jury returned a verdict for exemplary damages, but no actual
damages. The court reversed this judgment on the ground that
there may be no recovery of exemplary damages without an award
of actual damages. The third case, Trawick v. Martin-Brown Co.,"
was a suit for wrongful attachment of real estate in which there
was no proof of actual damages. The court held that recovery of
exemplary damages was precluded. The question of nominal damages was not discussed.
It is apparent that none of these three cases is absolute authority for the rule enunciated by Girard v. Moore. The first case is
direct authority against the rule, since it expressly declared that
nominal damages should be considered as actual damages in meeting the requirement of actual damages. In the other two cases
nominal damages were not even discussed. Nevertheless, the rule
has been consistently applied in Texas to prevent the recovery of
exemplary damages in any case in which no actual damages are
recovered.
In the recent case of Byrd v. Feilding" plaintiff sued for the
recovery of personalty wrongfully withheld by defendant and for
exemplary damages. Trial resulted in a judgment for recovery
of the personalty and for $150 exemplary damages. There was no
10 Id. at 51.
1175 Tex. 1, 12 S. W. 823 (.1889).
12 79 Tex. 460, 14 S. W. 564 (1890).
1 238 S. W. 2d 614 (Tex.Civ. App. 1951).
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finding of the value of the property withheld. On appeal, the case
was reversed and remanded for a new trial, the court applying
"the well recognized rule that there can be no recovery of exemplary damages in the absence of recovery of actual damages.""'
In doing so, the court attempted to distinguish the earlier case of
5 That case had declared that "the recovery
Steinberg v. Morgan."
of exemplary damages for an injury to or a trespass upon personal
property... is allowed, and it is not material to the application
of this rute whether the action is for the value of the property or
for the recovery of the property itself."'" The opinion in the Byrd
case distinguished the Steinberg case by noting that the value of
the property recovered in the latter case was stated in the judgment and provision made for return of the property in satisfaction of the judgment. Apparently, the conclusion to be drawn
from the two cases is that when the value of the property recovered is stated in the judgment together with a provision for satisfaction of the judgment by return of the property, exemplary
damages may be awarded. On the other hand, if the judgment is
merely for the recovery of the property, no exemplary damages
may be awarded. If a valid reason exists for making this illogical
distinction, the court failed to set it out.1"
Generally speaking, two reasons are given for the requirement
that compensatory damages be awarded before there may be a
recovery of exemplary damages: (1) a claim for exemplary damages is not a separate cause of action, and no action should be
allowed for the recovery of exemplary damages only; and (2)
since exemplary damages are in the nature of punishment, no
action should be maintained for the sole purpose of punishing the
14

Id. at 616.

15 300 S. W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
16 Id. at 256.

17 In a Comment in 3 Baylor L. Rev. 591, 593 (1951), the distinction is rationalized
on the basis of the difference between the common law actions of detinue and replevin.
The author properly condemns such a distinction as having no place in the decision
of this question today.

1951]
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defendant.'" Neither of these reasons will support the rule under
consideration. The first argument is met by showing that many
suits do not require actual damages as an essential element of the
cause of action. The second reason is refuted by the argument that
the suit is not for punishment alone but is for the vindication of a
legal right.' 9 The weakness of the rule is recognized by McCormick:
"Consequently, it seems desirable to recognize the principle that, if
a cause of action is found to exist by the jury, in a case where 'actual'
damage is not an essential element of the cause of action, then, if the
necessary culpability on defendant's part be established, a verdict for
exemplary damages is proper, though the award of other damages is
' 20
nominal or absent entirely."

It is apparent that the arguments made in favor of the rule
applied in Texas are fallacious. But if a different rule is to be
advocated, some positive reason for such a rule should be advanced. One such argument is that there seems to be no reason
to differentiate between suits in which actual damages are recovered and those in which actual damages are not essential to the
maintenance of the action. The purpose in each instance is the
vindication of a legal right. The fact that in one instance the damages are actual and in the other only technical seems to be no reason to say that in one exemplary damages may be awarded while
in the other they may not. In addition, it should be noted that "the
fundamental purpose underlying an award of exemplary... damages.., is to punish the wrong-doer in order that such punishment
may serve as a warning and example to prevent him and others
from the commission of like offenses and wrongs in the future.""
If the plaintiff has no more incentive to bring the suit than the

recovery of nominal damages, the offender will not be punished,
See Comment, 18 Tex. L. Rev. 488, 489 (1940).
19 Id. at 489.
20 MCCORMICK, DAMAGES (1935) 294.
21 Burlington-Rock Island R. Co. v. Newsom, 239 S. W. 2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.
1951).
18
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and the desired deterrent to further offenses will not be present.
Finally, the compensatory effect of exemplary damages probably
tends to remedy a weakness in the law of compensatory damages,
which often fails fully to make recompense for the injury usually
resulting to a plaintiff from the defendant's wilful, wanton, malicious, or oppressive conduct.
Closely related to the subject under discussion is the requirement that exemplary damages bear a reasonable relation to the
actual damages awarded.' The Texas courts are among the minority in requiring such a relationship.2" The requirement is defended
by McCormick as a rough means of assuring that the award will
not be the result of passion and prejudice on the part of the jury.2 4
Another writer has urged this rule as being the proper basis for
upholding the decision in Byrd v. Feilding.25 It is submitted that
the arguments made against the requirement of a recovery of actual damages apply with equal force to the requirement of a reasonable relationship to actual damages. The measure of exemplary
damages should be the degree of malice, oppression, or gross
negligence which forms the basis for the award and the amount
of money required to punish the defendant, considering his
financial condition. 26 These factors bear no necessary relationship
to the actual damages awarded. Consequently, where their presence justifies a greater degree of punishment, such punishment
should not be reduced or withheld because the actual damages
are small or non-existent. Perhaps there may arise situations in
which recourse to the rule as a rough limitation on jury passion
or prejudice is justified, but it should be recognized that the rule
is a guide only-not an inflexible rule preventing proper punishment where appropriate. 7
22

International & G. N. R. Co. v. Telephone & Tel. Co., 69 Tex. 277, 5 S. W. 517

(1887) ; Flannery v. Wood, 73 S. W. 1072 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903) er. ref.
23 25 C. J. S., Damages, § 126, p. 740.
24 MCCORMICK, DAMAGES (1935) 298.
22 See Comment, 3 Baylor L. Rev. 591
26 Note, 33 A. L. R. 384, 399 (1924).

(1951).

27 This point is illustrated in Cotton v. Cooper, 209 S. W. 135, 138 (Tex. Comm. App.
1919). An award of $3,500 exemplary damages based upon only $400 actual damages
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For the reasons indicated, it is submitted that the rule allowing
the recovery of exemplary damages in those suits in which actual
damages are not essential to the maintenance of the suit is preferable to that applied in Texas. In suits in which actual damages are
an essential element of the cause of action, the rule that there
should be no recovery of exemplary damages in the absence of a
recovery of actual damages is appropriate. Perhaps without realizing it, and certainly without justifying it, the Texas courts have
applied the same rule to suits in which actual damages are not
essential to the maintenance of the action. Perhaps the Texas rule
is so well settled and of such long standing that future courts will
refuse to disturb it even though impressed by the arguments
against it. Should they be so inclined, however, it seems the rule
could be overruled on the basis of the weight of authority elsewhere and on the basis of the demonstrated erroneous manner in
which it was developed.
A. E. Collier.

was upheld because "the welfare of society demands the imposition of such punish.
ment" of the "nefarious" activities of defendant loan company.

